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Abstract 
In E (CA799/2012) v R  [2013] NZCA 678   the Court of Appeal directly 
confronted the issue of whether demeanour warnings should be required in all 
criminal jury trials.  Such a warning would alert a jury to the risks of using 
demeanour to assess credibility.  While science has shown that demeanour is 
an unreliable tool for assessing credibility, the Court decided that a demeanour 
warning was not always required.  As such, the law appears to be out of step 
with contemporary science.  This article contrasts   the traditional approach to 
the usefulness of demeanour evidence in criminal jury trials with a more 
modern understanding of its actual usefulness.  Drawing on both social science 
and case authorities, this paper will critically evaluate the Court’s approach to 
this issue.   The conclusion is reached that a demeanour warning actually 
should be mandatory in all criminal jury trials.  
 
 Keywords for cataloguing: demeanour, criminal jury trials, credibility,                 
Evidence Act 2006.  
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There's no one in the world who can look at a person and know that they are 
lying… there are a lot of bloody guilty people who can acquit themselves 
extremely well…. So is that what we are going to have? The best liar wins? 1 
 
I Introduction    
Historically, observation of a witness’ demeanour while testifying was considered a reliable 
method of assessing their credibility.  Judicial thought reflected this belief, and judges would 
regularly invite jurors to take a witness’ demeanour into account when making such 
assessments.2    However, the consensus of current research casts serious doubts on the 
accuracy of this practice.  Social science suggests that when people use demeanour to assess 
credibility, they operate at mere chance level.3  As Zuckerman and Roberts assert, most 
people would have greater success in spotting lies by tossing a coin, rather than relying on 
any assumed innate capability, to assess truthfulness. 4    
In 2013, the Court of Appeal was presented with an opportunity, in E(CA799/2012) v R  (E v 
R),  to clarify the relative usefulness of demeanour, in assessing credibility.  The Court heard 
three appeals, all of which raised the same question of law: whether a warning to the jury, 
about the risks of relying on demeanour to assess credibility, should be mandatory. 5 In 
dismissing all three appeals the Court reached two conclusions: 6 
A warning about the risks of relying on the demeanour of a witness when 
assessing credibility is not invariably required…. [ and] … two points should 
generally be conveyed to the jury in some form. First, the assessment of the 
credibility and reliability of a witness should be broadly based, taking into 
account the evidence as a whole and such of the factors we shortly describe as 
may be relevant to the case. Second, demeanour may properly be taken into 
                                                             
1 Greg King,  “Debate over the right to silence” (“Justice Hot Tub”,  Victoria University School of Law, 
Wellington, 20 July 2012).    
2 Lord Bingham “Assessing Contentious Eyewitness Evidence: Judicial View” in Anthony Heaton-Armstrong 
and others (eds) Witness Testimony, Psychological, Investigative and Evidential Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2006)  at  [18.12]. 
3 Adrian Zuckerman and Paul Roberts Criminal Evidence ( 2nd Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 
299. 
4 At 299.  
5 E (CA799/2012) v R  [2013] NZCA 678 at [1]. 
6 E (CA799/2012) v R  [2013], above n 5, at [41]. 
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account but is best not considered in isolation. Rather, demeanour should be 
considered as one factor in the broader assessment. 
Putting aside the inconsistency within these conclusions, they are problematic for two 
reasons.   First, the Court’s analysis downplays the problem itself, which is that demeanour-
based credibility assessments are as likely to be wrong as they are correct.  This problem is 
compounded by the fact that people generally have a completely inaccurate appreciation of 
their own ability to make such assessments.7 By failing to recognise the scope of the issue, 
the Court missed an opportunity to ensure that practice in jury trials conforms with state of 
knowledge of contemporary science.   
 
Secondly, the Court ignores the vital purpose a demeanour warning could serve, in 
discouraging juries from relying on demeanour to assess credibility.  For the purposes of this 
paper a demeanour warning refers to a warning to the jury that contains the following 
information: 
 That demeanour is an unreliable tool for assessing credibility, due to the general 
inability of people to accurately make such assessments. 
 There are significant risks in making demeanour-based credibility assessments.  
 Instead of demeanour other indicia, such as consistency and plausibility, should be 
primarily used to assess credibility. 
This is not to say that a demeanour warning would be completely effective.  However, a 
mandatory demeanour warning is a preferable alternative to simply allowing juries to assess 
credibility from demeanour, without appreciating the risks involved.  The better view is that 
since demeanour indicators are such an unreliable method of assessing credibility their 
influence should be minimised as much as possible.  It follows then that a demeanour 
warning should always be given.   This would improve the fact-finding process by 
encouraging jurors to assess credibility on a more reliable basis.  
 
 I will support this position through a three-pronged argument, in parts II, III and IV of this 
paper. Part II will examine the problems that demeanour poses, in terms of assessing 
credibility.   It will provide some context, which will include the Court of Appeal’s definition 
of  demeanour in E v R, and some contemporary beliefs about the role of demeanour 
                                                             
7 Andreas Kapardis Psychology and Law a Critical Introduction (3rd Ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Melbourne) at 264. 
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assessments in criminal jury trials.  Next, it will investigate the actual usefulness of 
demeanour in assessing credibility, based on social science research.   It will become clear 
that the Court’s statement, that demeanour should still be part of the general credibility 
assessment, is not supported by current research.  
 
Part III will examine the Court’s analysis in E v R, including a review of relevant  case 
authorities.   It is submitted that these authorities support my argument, that a demeanour 
warning should be mandatory, rather than the Court’s decision. I will also critically evaluate 
the reasoning which lead the Court  to conclude that such warnings are not always necessary.  
This part will also deal with some additional sources that the Court drew upon to justify this 
conclusion, including Stanley v R (Stanley) , a New Zealand Law Commission report and the 
Evidence Act 2006 (the Act).8    In particular, I will argue that the Act implicitly supports a 
mandatory demeanour warning.  
 
Part IV will focus on how a jury warning would actually address the problem that demeanour 
poses for credibility assessments. This will include a brief exploration of jury research into 
the impact of judicial directions.  I will argue that judicial discretion, in respect of demeanour 
warnings, is actually part of the problem.  This is in contrast to the Court’s assertion that such 
discretion should be unfettered.  Finally, I will conclude that the better approach would have 
been to make a demeanour warning a mandatory part of a judge’s directions to the jury in 
criminal trials.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 Stanley v R [2012] NZCA 462 ; Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP 27, 
1997). 
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 II  The problem relating to demeanour-based credibility assessments 
A    The use of evidence of demeanour in New Zealand 
Demeanour has been described as “outward behaviour” or “bearing”. 9 The Court in   E v R  
preferred Lord Bingham’s characterisation of demeanour, although it further developed his  
Lordship’s definition:10 
We start our discussion by a consideration of what constitutes demeanour. 
Writing  extra-judicially, Lord Bingham has described demeanour as:  
“ … [the witness's] conduct, manner, bearing, behaviour, delivery, inflexion; in 
short, anything which characterises [the witness's] mode of giving evidence but 
does not appear in a transcript of what [the witness] actually said.” 
We add that demeanour also includes the personality or character of a witness. 
Given the breadth of what may be embraced by the concept of demeanour, we 
do not think it helpful to speak of “body language” as some traditional jury 
directions have done. 
The Court’s addition (in italics) was a problematic starting point for its discussion of 
demeanour, given that it is not strictly correct.  While the Court included personality or  
character as part of demeanour, these  are usually considered aspects of propensity evidence.  
What the Court described is essentially moral credibility or veracity, which is defined in the 
Act as the disposition of a person to refrain from lying, whether generally or in the 
proceeding. 11    However, this is not what a jury is being asked to establish.  Rather, a jury’s 
task concerns an inquiry into probative credibility, which determines whether the witness is 
lying or telling the truth while giving evidence. This does not involve character, but the 
accuracy and reliability of the witness’ statements. 12     
 
Of greater concern was the Court’s assertion that demeanour should still be part of the overall 
credibility assessment, although it did acknowledge that demeanour in isolation was not a 
good indicator of credibility.13    This suggests that the Court believed that while demeanour 
might not be useful by itself when it is weighed alongside other factors, such as consistency, 
                                                             
9 Catherine Soanes  Angus Stevenson (eds) Oxford Concise English Dictionary ( 11th Ed,  Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2008) at 380. 
10 E (CA799/2012) v R  [2013] above n 5, at [24]; Lord Bingham, above n 2 , at  [18.13-18.20]. 
11 Evidence Act 2006, s 37(5).  
12 Zuckerman and Roberts, above n 3, at 347. 
13 E (CA799/2012) v R  [2013], above n 5, at [43]. 
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it may be useful in assessing credibility.  I submit that this is a flawed premise. The addition 
of other factors is not going to change the nature of demeanour indicators so that they 
suddenly become a more reliable guide to credibility.  If anything, the reverse is true.  As 
research has shown, demeanour indicators are as likely to give jurors incorrect clues as to a 
witness’ credibility, as they are  correct ones.14  Thus, demeanour is likely to confuse the 
overall credibility assessment, as at least half of the time it will be at odds with the more 
reliable credibility indicators.  
 
The Court’s insistence on keeping demeanour as part of the credibility assessment exercise 
shows a disconnection between the scientific understanding that demeanour is not an accurate 
tool for assessing credibility, and the justice system’s preference for live testimony.    
Although it has been suggested that there is no presumption that evidence must be presented 
in this way, the Evidence Act 2006 expressly provides that the ordinary method of giving 
evidence is via a witness testifying in person before the judge and/or jury. 15   According to 
Zuckerman and Roberts this inclination towards viva voce evidence seems based on the 
assumption that demeanour is a reliable guide to veracity. 16 
 
Social science strongly indicates that this assumption is incorrect, as the next section of this 
paper will discuss in greater detail.  Regardless, the Act’s provisions ensure that usually a 
jury will hear a witness’ evidence in person. Thus, a witness’ demeanour will generally be on 
display while they testify and has the potential to confuse the jurors’ credibility assessment, 
with potentially misleading cues.  For example, a witness’ demeanour while presenting 
evidence often determines how convincingly the content of that evidence is delivered.17  
Research has shown that speakers who exude confidence are more likely to be believed than 
nervous ones.18  This is problematic, given that confidence and nervousness may have no 
relation to whether the witness is telling the truth.19    
 
 
                                                             
14 Zuckerman and Roberts, above n 3, at 300. 
15  Elisabeth McDonald  Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases ( Brookers, Wellington, 2012) at 86. 
16  Zuckerman and Roberts, above n 3, at 300.  
17  Zuckerman and Roberts, above n 3, at 299. 
18 Robert Fisher “ Can we tell when people are lying ? “  (Paper presented to AMINZ  conference, Auckland, 25 
July 2013) at 5 ; Hazel Genn “Assessing Credibility” (2011) 11 Tribunals Journal at 2. 
19  Genn “Assessing Credibility” , above n 18, at 2. 
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Even when a witness testifies in an alternative way  demeanour is implicitly in issue. 20  In 
such circumstances, the Act requires the judge to direct the jury not to draw any adverse 
inferences against the defendant.21  The requirement for a direction implies that juries will not 
automatically treat evidence from a screened or pre-recorded witness  the same way they 
would a witness in-person.  Similarly, the Courts (Remote Participation) Act 2010 provides 
for witness’ testimony to be delivered via audio-visual link, when the witness cannot be 
physically present in the courtroom. 22   When deciding whether to allow a witness to present 
evidence from a remote location, a judge must consider the potential impact on the parties’ 
ability to assess the witness’ credibility.23  This suggests that Parliament believed there was 
some particular advantage to hearing testimony in person. The implication, of Parliament’s  
drafting in both enactments, is that there is a persistent notion that demeanour can be useful 
in assessing credibility, even at the legislative level. 
 
 In some cases the inability to observe a  witness’  demeanour has given rise to  arguments 
that this breaches the defendant’s rights to confront their accuser and conduct a full defence. 
24    In particular, it has been argued that a witness’ demeanour must be available for the 
jury’s consideration during cross-examination.25  Such arguments rely on the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, which specifically provides for a defendant’s right to present a 
defence and examine the prosecution’s witnesses.26  In Police v Razamjoo (Razamjoo), a case 
of fraud,  two female Muslim witnesses were required to remove their burqa while giving 
evidence. 27 However, they were allowed to testify from behind a screen, so their faces could 
only be seen by the Judge, counsel and female court staff.  The Court felt this was an 
appropriate balance between the witnesses’ religious rights and the defendant’s fair trial 
entitlements.28  Similar arguments have been raised in other jurisdictions, with troubling 
implications for rape and sexual assault complainants. 29  
 
                                                             
20 Evidence Act 2006, s 105.  
21 Section 123. 
22 Courts (Remote Participation) Act 2010, s 7. 
23 Section 5(c)(i).  
24 Richard Mahoney and others The Evidence Act 2006 Act and Analysis ( 3rd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2014) at 
466. 
25 At 377. 
26 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(e)(f).  
27 Police v Razamjoo [2005] DCR 408. 
28 Police v Razamjoo [2005] , above n 27, at [22]. 
29 See R v S (N) [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726  at  [99]-[109] per Abella J dissenting. 
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The Razamjoo decision appears to reinforce the view that it is important for a jury to be able 
to see a witness’ demeanour.  The pervasiveness of this belief was also apparent in a recent 
decision of Hon Judith Collins, Minister of Justice (“The Minister”).  The Minister sought 
Cabinet’s approval to rescind a previous decision relating to a required demeanour warning 
for  child witnesses giving evidence in an alternative way.30   The original permission was for 
a required judicial warning to prevent jurors drawing inferences from a child witness’ 
demeanour, particularly if that demeanour displayed a lack of distress.31 However, the 
Minister stated that demeanour could be a relevant consideration for the jury in determining 
credibility.32  She reasoned that if inferences could not be drawn from demeanour, evidence 
would not need to be given in person. 33   The Minister is correct that demeanour observation 
of a witness’ testimony  sometimes allows for the drawing of correct inferences.  However, as 
research has shown, those inferences are equally likely to be incorrect. 
 
B    Social science research and the use of demeanour evidence 
Social science played only a minor role in the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in E v R.  
Although the Court acknowledged a number of authorities the appellant cited, it confined 
them to a single footnote.34  The Court also acknowledged Professor Paul Ekman’s assertion 
that “few people do better than chance when judging whether someone is lying or truthful.” 35  
However, it still based its conclusions primarily on judicial rather than scientific thought.               
In contrast, other courts have  shown less  reluctance to make use of science in reaching their 
conclusions.  The Court of Appeal in R v Munro (Munro) used several articles to supplement 
its assertions on the perceived difficulties with jurors’ credibility assessments.36  In E 
(CA113/09) v R (No 3) the Court of Appeal utilised Aldert Vrij’s work in respect of lie 
detection, to support its conclusion that  a  witness’ credibility could be assessed from a pre-
recorded video, without first-hand observation of their demeanour.37  
                                                             
30 Judith Collins “Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006” (12 November 2013) CAB 100/2008/1 at [43-46]. 
31  At [44]. 
32  At [45]. 
33  At [45]. 
34 E (CA799/2012) v R [2013], above n 5, at [21]. 
35 E (CA799/2012) v R, above n 5, at [31]; Paul Ekman Telling Lies (Berkley Books, New York, 1986). 
36 R v Munro [2007] NZCA 510 at [79-81]; Marcus Stone “ Instant lie detection? Demeanour and credibility in 
criminal trials” Crim. L.R. 1991 821-830 .   
37 E (CA113/09) v R (No 3) [2010] NZCA 544 at [75], [82],[86] and [88].  
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By making only a token acknowledgment of contemporary social science I suggest that the 
Court in E v R missed an important step.  While research alone could not have been 
determinative of the legal issue, at the very least it could have aided the Court in reaching a 
conclusion on the practical issues surrounding demeanour – as the Courts in E (CA113/09) v 
R (No 3) and Munro appear to have done.    It is not suggested that it would have been 
appropriate for the Court of Appeal to commence an intensive review and then decide solely 
on the basis of research findings.   But, by concentrating on judicial statements and giving 
little attention to the research perspective, the Court virtually ignores the underlying scientific 
basis upon which the validity of those judicial statements rests.   As such, I argue that the 
Court should have based its views on contemporary social science research.  
Had it done so, the Court would have gained an appreciation of the two highly problematic 
elements in demeanour-based credibility assessments.   First, demeanour itself is an 
unreliable tool for assessing credibility.  As previously stated, research has shown that when 
people use demeanour indicators to assess another person’s credibility, they operate at mere 
chance level, whether they are professionals or laypeople.38   Fifty years of research into lie 
detection  has shown that generally a person’s probability  of spotting a lie, based on 
observation of behaviour and listening to speech, is about 54 per cent. 39     
This general deficiency in lie detection  arises in part  from people’s reliance on the wrong 
cues, particularly gaze aversion and nervousness, to indicate dishonesty. 40    Generally  held 
beliefs about which demeanour cues signal deception are often fundamentally wrong. 41  Ian  
Coyle described a jury’s assessments of credibility being based partly upon “worthless 
though pervasive behavioural stereotypes.”42  Coyle asserted that a very significant 
proportion of both laypersons’ and professionals’ beliefs about non-verbal and verbal cues to 
deception have been repeatedly shown to be incorrect.43  Similarly,  experimentation has 
                                                             
38 Elisabeth McDonald and Yvette Tinsley “Use of Alternative Ways of Giving Evidence by Vulnerable 
Witnesses: Current Proposals, Issues and Challenge”  42 VUWLR 705  at 20.  
39 Aldert Vrij, Par Anders Granhag, Samantha Mann and Sharon Leal, “Outsmarting the Liars: Toward a 
Cognitive Lie Detection Approach” (2011)  Current Directions in Psychological Science 20 (1) 28 at 28.  
40 Aldert Vrij, Par Anders Granhag, Stephen Porter  “ Pitfalls and Opportunities in Nonverbal and Verbal Lie 
Detection” (2010) Psychological Studies in the Public Interest 000(00) at 8 and 10.  
41 Kapardis, above n 7, at 266. 
42 Ian R Coyle “ How Do Decision Makers Decide When Witnesses Are Telling The Truth And What Can Be 
Done To Improve Their Accuracy In Making Assessments Of Witness Credibility?” (  Report to The Criminal 
Lawyers Association of Australia and New Zealand, 3 April 2013) at 8. 
43 Coyle, above n 42, at 3 and 8. 
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demonstrated that the ordinary person’s ability to determine truthfulness based on observing 
these cues, is virtually non-existent.  44  
 While demeanour can be a useful  tool for interpreting ordinary behaviour under normal  
circumstances, in the artificial environment of a courtroom those norms do not apply.  45  
Reliance on demeanour leaves the jury open to two types of potential error:  mistakenly 
believing a liar and mistakenly disbelieving a truthful witness.46  The confident liar is able to 
exhibit physiological signs that would normally be associated with truthfulness whereas a 
truthful witness, whose psychological make-up includes a fear of being disbelieved, will 
exhibit discomfort and anxiety under examination.47  It has been suggested that repeat 
offenders are likely to give evidence with increased confidence, and are thus more likely to 
be believed.48  
These incorrect beliefs about demeanour cues have also been discussed in relation to rape 
complainants.49   Demeanour based credibility assessments are particularly unjust to such 
complainants, because of reliance upon myths about the way they should react. 50 As such, a 
truthful complainant who does not display demeanour consistent with commonly held beliefs 
about rape victims may find that jurors, incorrectly, find them less credible.  While it is 
commonly perceived that high levels of emotion are associated with credibility for rape 
victims, neither a highly-emotional nor a seemingly  emotionless appearance have any 
relation to truthfulness. 51  
 The second problematic aspect of demeanour-based credibility assessments is that people’s   
perceptions of their ability to make such evaluations are generally incorrect.  Even police and 
corrections officers, who routinely deal with criminals, have no greater ability to discern 
truthfulness than a layperson. 52    Essentially, people are as likely to be wrong as they are 
right, while at the same time believing they are making correct credibility assessments. 
                                                             
44 Olin Guy Wellborn “Demeanour” (1991) 76 Cornell L Rev 1075 at  12. 
45  Stone, above n 31, at 4. 
46  Genn, above n 18,  at 3 ;  Stone, above n 31, at 4; Ekman, above n 30. 
47  Genn, above n 18,  at 4. 
48  Fisher, above n 18, at 5.  
49  McDonald and Tinsley, above n  36. 
50 Natasha Bakht  What’s in a Face ? “ Demeanour Evidence in the Sexual Assault Context” in  Elisabeth A. 
Sheehy (ed) Sexual Assault in Canada (University of Ottawa Press, 2012) at 600. 
51 McDonald and Tinsley, above n  33, at 20 . 
52 Kapardis, above n 7, at 265. 
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Zuckerman and Roberts characterise this as a “double whammy” to the tradition of live oral 
testimony. 53    
The clear message of contemporary research can be summed up in the following statement, 
by former High Court Judge Robert Fisher QC: 54 
 The overwhelming conclusion is that demeanour is not a useful guide to 
veracity. There are no observational advantages when assessing the honesty of a 
witness’ evidence… Those who think they are capable of assessing veracity 
through demeanour are mistaken. 
If the conclusions of social science research are to be accepted, then it appears that the best 
approach would be to minimise the impact of demeanour on credibility assessments, as much 
as possible. The Court of Appeal in E v R  concluded  that traditional directions which 
emphasised the usefulness of demeanour in assessing credibility, needed to be modified. 55 
Although this represents progress from the previous position, I submit that this is still 
insufficient to bring the law into step with science. Rather, juries should always be warned 
against using demeanour to make such assessments. At the very least, jurors should be 
expressly told that if they place reliance on demeanour to ascertain a witness’ credibility they 
have  a one in two chance of  making an incorrect determination.  
 
III  The Court of Appeal’s decision in  E  v R  
A    The Court’s review of relevant case authorities 
As discussed above the Court in E v R placed very little reliance on social science. Instead it 
preferred judicial views on demeanour’s usefulness, which it drew from relevant cases and 
extra-judicial writing. However, I submit that the Court’s conclusions are actually at variance 
with what these sources say, regarding the problematic nature of demeanour-based credibility 
assessments.  The Court cited Lord Devlin, who suggested that any advantages to hearing 
testimony first-hand in order to assess truthfulness were overrated. 56  Similarly, Justice 
MacKenna suggested that as a judge he relied on demeanour cues as little as possible in order 
                                                             
53 Zuckerman and Roberts, above n 3, at  300.  
54 Fisher, above n 18, at 5. 
55 E (CA799/2012) v R  [2013], above n 5, at [42]. 
56 E (CA799/2012) v R, above n 6 at [26]; Patrick Devlin The Judge (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979) at 
63. 
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to determine fact. 57  Even stronger statements were made by Lord Bingham, from whom the 
Court drew its definition of demeanour. His Lordship asserted that, “To rely on demeanour is 
in most cases to attach importance to deviations from a norm when there is in truth no 
norm.”58  All of these statements clearly question whether demeanour has any use in 
assessing credibility.  Yet the Court of Appeal did not reach the same conclusion.  
The Court also cited a number of cases which discussed  “the demeanour issue.” 59 When 
read as a whole, these authorities also seemed to strongly question demeanour’s usefulness in 
assessing credibility.  In  Fox v Percy (Fox) it was suggested that contemporary judges are 
now much more aware of the doubts that science casts on people’s ability to assess credibility 
from demeanour cues.60 In Munro  a full court of the Court of Appeal challenged the ability 
of juries to determine credibility from demeanour observation. 61  The Court, in Munro, also 
specifically discussed credibility and demeanour within the context of research, and expressly 
referred to Marcus Stone’s finding that visual cues which might traditionally be associated 
with honesty are not necessarily indicative of truthfulness. 62 That Court  also agreed that the 
artificial environment of the courtroom hinders most jurors’  assessment of  credibility.63  The 
Court, in Munro,  also accepted that confident speakers are more likely to be believed, 
regardless of whether they are actually telling  the truth. 64     
However, the Court in E v R cited Munro for the statement that, “tone of voice, pauses, 
gestures and facial expression could all assist in conveying meaning”   as if to suggest that 
Munro is an authority which supports the use of demeanour in assessing credibility. 65    It is 
true that in Munro  the Court did suggest there were advantages in hearing or seeing 
witnesses directly,  but this was said in the context of contrasting the positions of a judge at 
first instance with that of an appellate court.66  Also these remarks must be kept in context 
with other statements made in Munro,  concerning the unhelpfulness of demeanour in 
assessing credibility, and its direct references to the research supporting that view.  The Court 
in  E v R also  appears to contrast  Munro with Fox, as though the two cases stood for 
                                                             
57 E (CA799/2012) v R, above n 5, at [27];  Brian MacKenna “Discretion” (1974) IX (new series) The Irish 
Jurist  at 10. 
58 E (CA799/2012) v R, above n 5,  at [24]; Lord Bingham, above n 2,  at  [18.18]. 
59 E (CA799/2012) v R, above n 5,  at [24]; At [30] 
60 At [30]; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at  [31]. 
61 R v Munro [2007] , above n 31, [84]. 
62 R v Munro [2007]  above n 31 , at [79]. 
63 E (CA799/2012) v R, above n 5,  at [31]; R v Munro [2007],  above n 31, at  [79]. 
64 E (CA799/2012) v R, above n 5,  at [31]; R v Munro [2007],  above n 31, at [79-80];   
65 R v Munro [2007]  above n 31, at [73]. 
66 At [74]. 
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different propositions. This is not so. In Munro the Court not only cited Fox with approval 
but the statements, regarding the limitations of demeanour-based credibility assessments are 
congruous between the two cases.67   
Another relevant authority, the Court of Appeal’s decision in  E (CA113/09) v R (No 3), also 
stressed the risks inherent in relying on demeanour to assess credibility, and expressly cited 
Vrij’s work as evidence of those risks.68 That Court approached questions regarding 
demeanour from a slightly different angle i.e. whether hearing evidence first-hand gives any 
advantage, compared to an appellate court’s usual reliance on transcripts. 69  However, that 
Court still  made a clear statement about the risky nature of demeanour-based credibility 
assessments.70   
 A similar statement was made in Sateki v R (Sateki).   In that case the Court of Appeal 
commented that demeanour was a “notoriously unreliable means of assessing credibility”.71 
This seems to  affirm the dangers of reliance upon demeanour.  The Court of Appeal in E v R 
felt that “notoriously unreliable” was too strong a characterisation, preferring to acknowledge 
a degree of risk in relying on demeanour alone.  This downplaying of the risks seems at odds 
with the Court’s earlier acknowledgment of  the work of  Paul Ekman and Lord Bingham.  
Both of those authors’ comments seem to support the argument that “notoriously unreliable” 
is actually an accurate characterisation.  
In the case of   S (CA749/2012) v R  (S v R), the Court of Appeal took a similar approach to 
Sateki stating that there were “well-recognised dangers” in assessing credibility through 
demeanour. 72 This appears to be a clear acknowledgement of the problem.  The Court in E v 
R mentioned this point almost in passing, which is consistent with its overall approach to the 
case authorities.  In my view the Court failed to acknowledge the cumulative message that 
these cases present:  that demeanour-based credibility assessments are seriously flawed.   
Instead the Court drew two conclusions from the authorities:73 
                                                             
67 At [77]. 
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First, the risk is not so much placing reliance on demeanour evidence per se.  
Rather, the real risk arises through considering demeanour evidence in isolation 
from other evidence and relevant factors. 
Second that assessing credibility is closely linked to reliability and where both 
are at issue they should be approached in a similar way.  
Putting the second point aside, the first statement does not seem to follow from the 
authorities.  Among the cases it cited, only Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Wong expressly 
makes a similar point about assessing credibility from demeanour in isolation.74  The only 
other statement to the effect that demeanour should not be viewed in isolation, comes from 
the Court itself when it commented on a very brief citation from Sateki.75    As such, there 
does not seem to be a strong basis from case authority to support this conclusion.  
Furthermore, the Court has not correctly framed the problem.  As  jury  research has shown,  
juries generally do not consider demeanour as the sole determinant of credibility.76  The real 
problem does not concern jurors using demeanour in isolation, the real problem is concerned 
with jurors using demeanour at all, even in combination with other indicators, to assess 
credibility.  
In effect the Court has suggested that demeanour should be compared alongside detail and 
plausibility, which science suggests are generally more reliable indicators than demeanour.77 
But, as argued in Part II jurors’ consideration of demeanour hinders their overall assessment 
of credibility. The problem with the Court’s  suggestion arises when jurors evaluate the 
plausibility of a witness’ evidence correctly, but then weigh it against the witness’ 
demeanour.  While the witness’ plausibility may correctly indicate their degree of credibility, 
the witness’ demeanour has only a one in two chance of giving a correct indication.  This is 
why it is possible, as Genn suggested, for a completely truthful witness to be disbelieved, due 
to misleading cues from their demeanour.  78   
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It is true that the Court’s conclusions were a progression from the traditional view,  that 
demeanour is useful in assessing credibility. 79 However, given the clear message that comes 
from both the social science research and case authorities, those conclusions do not 
acknowledge the degree of the problem.  Rather, what the Court should have said is that 
demeanour is an unreliable indicator, when compared to plausibility and consistency, and  
these criteria should be considered first in a credibility assessment, instead of demeanour.  If 
demeanour is to be used in such assessments at all, the jury should be informed about its 
unreliability, so that it does not offset those other indicators and lead jurors to incorrectly 
evaluate a witness’ credibility.  The logical corollary of this, to be discussed in Part IV, is that 
since a problem has been identified the Court should  have acknowledged the best methods 
for  remedying it. 
 
B   The Court’s arguments against a Demeanour warning  
As discussed above, neither research nor case authorities appear to support the Court’s 
minimalistic view of the risks posed by demeanour-based credibility assessments.  Even if the 
Court had been correct about these risks, the justifications it provides for a warning being 
unnecessary are questionable.  To support its position the Court relied on arguments raised in 
Stanley v R, as well as that case itself standing for a general proposition that demeanour 
warnings are not always required. 
Stanley can be immediately contrasted with the majority of cases cited above, in particular 
Fox, Munro, E (CA113/09) v R,  S v R  and Sateki.  These cases all highlighted the well-
established dangers of assessing credibility from demeanour.  As such, it seems reasonable to 
argue that they weigh in favour of a required demeanour warning.   The approach of the 
Court of Appeal in Stanley was similar to that of the Court in E v R , in that it  downplayed 
the unreliability of demeanour indicators.80  In Stanley,  despite the District Court Judge’s 
implicit invitation to the jury to take note of the complainant’s demeanour, the Court of 
Appeal found that a demeanour warning was unnecessary. 81 
The Court, in E v R,  appears to adopt the view  that since a warning was not required in 
Stanley, one cannot be invariably required.   This does not seem justifiable.   Assuming 
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Stanley, and the subsequent appeal were correctly decided, they still do not lay down any 
general proposition regarding demeanour warnings.  Stanley   dealt specifically with the 
question of demeanour warnings within the context of its particular circumstances.82  That 
Court expressly declined to make any general comment on the subject of demeanour 
warnings.83  Also, despite the Court in E v R’s reference to it, the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent denial of leave is also unhelpful, as it provided very little insight into its reasoning 
process. The only clear message provided by the Supreme Court was that judicial directions 
should be case-specific.84  Given that it does not provide much substantive reasoning or 
discussion in respect of demeanour warnings, Stanley actually seems more ambivalent 
concerning any general requirement, rather than opposing one as the Court in E v R 
suggested. 
The Court of Appeal  in both Stanley and E v R , observed that the Evidence Act 2006 is 
silent on demeanour warnings. 85    I submit that despite the Act not expressly providing for a 
mandatory demeanour warning, it  would implicitly would support such an instruction.  
Among the purposes of the Act is the provision for facts for to be established by the 
application of logical rules.86  Employing logic, it would seem that the Act would prefer 
the fact-finder to use reliable methods of assessing credibility over unreliable ones, such 
as demeanour.  It follows then that warning jurors against using unreliable credibility 
indicators would enhance the rational ascertainment of facts. The more reliable the 
credibility assessment of witnesses, the more likely it seems that the fact-finder will arrive 
at a correct verdict.  This approach appears prima facie in line with the Act’s purpose, to 
secure the just determination of proceedings.   
Furthermore, the Act provides for directions and warnings in certain circumstances. For 
example, if a witness gives evidence in an alternative way the judge must direct the jury not 
to draw an adverse inference against the defendant, because of the manner of giving 
evidence. 87   However, it is not an exhaustive  source of  such instructions.   Many directions 
are found outside the Act. For example, judges are invariably required to direct juries on the 
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onus of proof. 88    A key source of judicial warnings, the New Zealand Criminal Jury Trials 
Bench Book(the Bench Book) was absent from the Court’s discussion in E v R.   The Bench 
Book is only available for research in limited circumstances but some key insights were 
generously provided by the Honourable Justice Graham Lang, Chairman of the Bench Book 
Editing Committee. In particular, the Bench Book does not provide any general demeanour 
warnings. 89   However, had the Court mentioned this general silence on demeanour 
warnings, rather than the Act’s, it might have been more persuasive argument against them.  
The Courts in both Stanley and E v R  also referred to the Law Commission’s Report on 
Evidence Law: Character and Credibility. 90  The Commission’s discussion of the subject 
began by highlighting the inadequacy of demeanour as a determinant of  truthfulness.91  The 
report suggested that cultural differences make demeanour cues even less reliable, as certain 
cultural norms can easily be misinterpreted. 92  Nonetheless, the Commission decided that 
demeanour warnings should be fashioned according to the circumstances of the case rather 
than be generally required.93 It felt that an evidence code would probably be unable to correct 
for problematic cultural perceptions. 94 With respect, the Commission identified a legitimate 
problem and then suggested that nothing be done about it. This appears to leave the law in an 
unsatisfactory state.  
A similar report by the Australian Law Reform Commission(The Australian Commission) 
also dealt with the problem of misinterpretation of culture-specific demeanour cues.95  
However, I suggest that since science has shown that these cues are likely to be misread, a 
court should do its best to remove them from consideration altogether.  96    If an 
appropriately-worded warning was given to the jury to disregard all demeanour cues and 
focus on better indicators of credibility, this would seem to mitigate cultural 
misunderstandings.     Perhaps this is why the Australian Commission made a different 
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recommendation to its New Zealand counterpart, in respect of demeanour warnings, despite 
having similar concerns.97    
In summary,  neither  Stanley, nor the New Zealand Law Commission’s recommendations 
provide persuasive reasons against making  demeanour warnings mandatory –whereas the 
Act’s purposes would arguably support such warnings.  
 
Part IV   The usefulness of  a demeanour warning 
A  Research on the efficacy of judicial directions 
Having argued that demeanour should be removed from the assessment of credibility, as 
much as possible, the focus shifts to how this could be achieved.  Courts regularly instruct 
juries on matters of weight, regarding certain types of evidence, so the idea of a demeanour 
warning does not seem inappropriate, in principle.  Conversely, allowing jurors to make 
credibility assessments based on demeanour indicators, or to use demeanour alongside other 
indicators without a warning as to the risks, is to allow an unacceptably high element of 
chance into an already fraught exercise.  A demeanour warning would therefore seem to be in 
line with the Act’s purposes.98  It would assist with the rational ascertainment of facts, by 
encouraging jurors to assess witness’ credibility based on  more reliable indicia than 
demeanour.   
If questions of potential efficacy were raised, I would submit that such a warning would be 
well within the capabilities of jurors to follow. Prima facie, asking a jury to merely put aside 
whatever impressions they may have formed, based on a witness’ demeanour, seems a 
reasonable request.  This is corroborated by David Sklansky who suggests that while a jury 
cannot be asked to forget evidence they have seen, they can effectively set that evidence to 
one side, when assembling their determination of fact. 99  Also, Sklansky’s research has 
shown that if juries are given clear reasons why they are to disregard certain types of 
evidence, rather than an abstract direction, they are more likely to follow them. 100   
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I submit that a demeanour warning, and the reasons for not relying on demeanour to assess 
credibility, can be clearly explained.  This was even implied by the Court, in E v R ,  when it 
endorsed the Canadian model jury instruction. 101  The Canadian warning specifically 
mentions the relative usefulness of consistency and other factors, compared with demeanour, 
as indicators of credibility: 102  
What was the witness's manner when he or she testified? Do not jump to conclusions, 
however, based entirely on how a witness has testified. Looks can be deceiving. 
Giving evidence in a trial is not a common experience for many witnesses. People 
react and appear differently. Witnesses come from different backgrounds. They have 
different abilities, values and life experiences. There are simply too many variables to 
make the manner in which a witness testifies the only or most important factor in your 
decision.” 
 
As one author described it, this warning is permeated with cautions about the unreliability of 
demeanour evidence. 103   Although I differ from the Court of Appeal about the frequency 
with which such a warning should be given,  I concur  that this model could  serve well in the 
New Zealand context.   Following Sklansky’s suggestions about clear reasons, perhaps it 
could be accompanied by a brief and simple statement about current state of research: that 
demeanour-based credibility assessments generally operate with 50 per cent accuracy. This 
does not seem to be an overly complicated message for jurors to comprehend.  
Social science research also supports the idea that clearly instructed jurors may make better 
credibility assessments. Open-minded questioners, who do not jump to conclusions too 
quickly, can become aware of the difficulties of correctly identifying  a truthful, but nervous, 
witness. 104  Jurors, who are made aware of the weaknesses in demeanour-based credibility 
assessments, would therefore seem more likely to make accurate credibility deductions.  
Also, while Coyle did not go so far as to recommend an express judicial direction on the 
subject of demeanour and credibility he did recommend that the flawed judicial directions be 
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corrected.105    He suggested that having expert evidence on the subject of demeanour, as well 
as judicial directions based on scientific fact, would vastly improve a jury’s ability to 
properly distinguish truthfulness from deception. 106 This is certainly a step further than the 
Court, in E v R , was prepared to go. 
Furthermore, research clearly shows that some jury directions are better adhered to than 
others. 107 For example, a New Zealand jury study revealed that jurors often followed the 
direction not to draw inferences from a defendant who did not give evidence.108  However, 
the direction regarding inferences from proved facts was often misunderstood.  109   The 
reason for this disparity is that certain directions require jurors to make distinctions which are 
extremely subtle  or counter-intuitive.110  I submit that a demeanour warning would be less 
difficult for a jury to follow than some judicial directions that are currently in use.   
An example of a particularly complex contemporary judicial direction is the Woodhouse 
direction. This instruction requires a jury not to infer that a defendant who elects not to give 
evidence is guilty, but at the same time allows them to weigh that silence against accepting 
some or all of the defence’s submissions. 111    This distinction has been described as “fine at 
best” and whether it exists at all has been questioned. 112 Courts have also acknowledged that 
the jury is likely to make assumptions based on the election not to testify, whether a judicial 
warning is given or not. 113   Regardless when the Woodhouse direction is given, the 
expectation is still that a jury will follow it.  
In contrast, a demeanour warning similar to the Canadian model would demand far less of 
jurors.  Essentially, it would simply ask the jury to put one type of evidence aside, something 
Sklansky has argued they are already capable of doing.   Clearly, if Courts can expect juries 
to follow directions as conceptually challenging as Woodhouse, they should be able to expect 
them to follow a demeanour warning.  
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B    Judicial discretion as to the importance of demeanour in a case 
Another potentially beneficial aspect of a required demeanour warning would be its ability to 
reduce the possibility for appealable errors, by removing judicial discretion. Currently, with 
no express guidance from the Bench Book, it is for the judge to determine if demeanour is in 
issue and give whatever warning that he or she feels is necessary.  If the judge is incorrect, as 
to whether demeanour was in issue, and fails to give a warning the case might be overturned 
on appeal.114  This discretion is based on the assumption that a judge will actually know if 
demeanour is in issue or not, with respect to credibility.  I submit that, in the light of the 
research discussed earlier in this paper,  this assumption is not sound.  
For this assumption to be correct the judge would have to accurately determine that the 
witness’ demeanour may influence the jury’s credibility assessment.  This requires the judge 
to be able to accurately conduct both their own assessment of the witness’ demeanour and 
then accurately predict what use the jury will make of it.   However, expertise in reading 
micro-expressions is not part of standard legal training and research has shown that judges 
and lawyers are generally subject to the same margin of error as laypeople when using 
demeanour to assess credibility. 115  This is compounded by Zuckerman and Roberts’  
“double whammy”, that not only will a judge’s accurate assessment of demeanour be at 
chance level, but also that they will likely be completely incorrect about their own 
competence to make that assessment. 116    As such, there does not seem to be any principled 
basis on which to make the original assumption, and I submit that judicial discretion in this 
regard is part of the problem.  
In contrast, the Court,  in E v  R,  expressed concern that a required direction would restrict 
judicial discretion in tailoring case-specific warnings.117  Its view was that the judge should 
be unfettered, to craft a warning that would reflect demeanour’s relative importance in the 
case. 118  Here the Court was clearly relying on the aforementioned questionable assumption.  
The Bench Book and the Court in Stanley also suggest that the Judge should consider 
whether counsel raised demeanour as an issue, when deciding whether to give a demeanour 
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warning. 119   I argue that this should not be a definitive indicator because counsel  are 
similarly susceptible to error when assessing demeanour’s relation to credibility.   As 
submitted in Part II, the better approach is to assume that demeanour is almost always in 
issue to some degree, unless perhaps the witness testifies in an alternative way.   A mandatory 
demeanour warning would address the problem by removing judicial discretion, and the 
possibility for error that it presents.  
 
C   General arguments against a demeanour warning 
Having argued the merits of a mandatory demeanour warning I must now address some of the 
key arguments against one.  The primary argument against a general demeanour warning is 
that of misinterpretation. The potential for a demeanour warning to be misinterpreted by the 
jury has been asserted by the Court of Appeal in E v R, the Australian Law Reform 
Commission, and the Minister of Justice. 120  Anecdotally, when I informally discussed this 
paper’s premise with several legal academics the misinterpretation argument was the first 
raised.121  
The Court argued that a demeanour warning might be an invitation to the jury to disbelieve a 
witness or place diminished weight on their evidence. 122  Similarly, the Minister suggested 
that a jury may believe they are being “given a clue” by the judge and draw an incorrect 
inference.123  The Commission suggested that by giving a demeanour warning a judge may 
create doubt in the jury’s mind as to whether they have actually determined a witness’ 
truthfulness.124 They also raised the concern that such a warning may actually emphasise 
demeanour as a credibility-assessing tool. 125 It should be noted that despite these 
reservations, the Australian Law Reform Commission still recommended that courts should 
become more aware of the desirability of demeanour warnings.126 Perhaps this indicates the 
Commission felt that demeanour-based credibility assessments pose a greater threat to the 
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just determination of proceedings than the untested risks that the Court of Appeal asserted in 
E v R.    
Although the risk of misinterpretation sounds like a legitimate argument against making a 
demeanour warning mandatory, it is highly questionable for two reasons.  First, evidence 
shows that all jury warnings and directions are intrinsically flawed.127  Every warning carries 
a risk of misinterpretation.128  This was discussed by Sklansky, who asserted that before the 
actual efficacy of judicial directions could be investigated their inherent imperfection must be 
acknowledged. 129   Sklansky suggested that underlying reason for their shortcomings lies 
within the imperfect nature of juries themselves.130  This is not difficult to accept.  
Essentially, a jury is a group of strangers who are asked to effectively assess the probative 
credibility of other strangers.  
 Sklansky’s comments are made in the American context, but are generally supported by 
insights revealed by a New Zealand jury study.131  The study revealed that an overwhelming 
number of jurors found the judge’s summary of facts useful, but a majority ( 35 out of the 48 
trials surveyed) still fundamentally misunderstood aspects of the law they were asked to 
apply.132  These misunderstandings, which influenced the decision-making process, ranged 
from the ingredients of the offence to the standard of proof.133  Such errors indicate that it is 
unrealistic to expect juries to perfectly follow judicial directions.   However, this is no reason 
against making directions in general, otherwise no judicial direction should ever be made.  
Sklansky’s research shows that although directions may be followed imperfectly, they do still 
work.134 As such, the  risk of misinterpretation is not a persuasive argument against making a 
demeanour warning required. 
Secondly, the suggestion that a demeanour warning may cause the jury to think the judge is 
indicating their personal view is unpersuasive because, as New Zealand jury research has 
revealed, juries routinely do this anyway. 135  The study found that in the majority of cases 
there was a strong correlation between the jurors’ perception of the judge’s view and their 
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own view, although there was no correlation between that perception and the actual view of 
the judge. 136  Thus, a demeanour warning would likely be incidental to the jury trying to 
work out the judge’s view, rather than causative of it.  As such, this is not a persuasive 
argument against a mandatory demeanour warning.  
It has also been suggested, by the Court in E v R, that a demeanour warning is actually 
unnecessary.137  This was argued on the basis that jurors, in the New Zealand jury study, 
reported using a balanced assessment of the evidence as a whole to determine truthfulness.138   
However, the study’s authors were more cautious than the Court in evaluating jurors’ ability 
in this regard.  They stated that, “juries as a whole appeared to weigh up the reliability of 
testimony in the light of other evidence.” 139 The use of appeared perhaps suggests an 
implicit acknowledgement that this information was collected on the basis of self-reporting.  
Thus, it is not possible to conclusively say that even those jurors who claim to have 
conducted such a balanced credibility inquiry were not influenced in some part by the 
witness’ demeanour.    Furthermore, in a minority of cases jurors actually admitted that their 
impression of witnesses did influence their perceptions of their credibility. 140  This gave rise 
to three questionable acquittals.141   As such, while the study revealed other useful 
information about how judicial directions are received, it does not provide authoritative 
support for the Court of Appeal’s assertion. 
In the light of contemporary research the arguments against a required demeanour warning 
are unpersuasive.  Thus, I submit that a properly-explained demeanour warning would be a 
useful addition to every judge’s summation to the jury.    
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 V Conclusions 
Demeanour was once thought of as a useful tool for assessing the credibility of witnesses. 
However the commonly held belief, that people can detect lies from demeanour indicators 
alone, has been shown to be a popular misconception. Social science has demonstrated that 
most people have, at best, a fifty per cent chance of accurately using demeanour to spot 
deception. At the same time they are usually completely oblivious to this problem.  As such, 
demeanour is an unreliable tool for assessing a witness’ credibility.  
Unfortunately, this scientific understanding of demeanour evidence is not fully reflected in 
courtroom practice.   In E v R,   the Court of Appeal had a chance to bring the law into step 
with science, by making a demeanour warning mandatory in criminal jury trials. Instead the 
Court took an overly conservative approach, in which it suggested that demeanour could still 
be part of  witness credibility assessments.  This approach was a development on previous 
practice, in which judges actively encouraged juries to observe demeanour to assess 
credibility.  However it still lags behind science, in terms of recognising the truth about the 
flawed nature of such assessments.  
I have argued that a demeanour warning should be mandatory in all criminal jury trials.  This 
position is supported by both social science and case authorities, including those authorities 
cited in E v R.  A demeanour warning would benefit the trial process by raising jurors’ 
awareness of the risks involved in demeanour-based credibility assessments.  It would 
enhance the rational ascertainment of facts by requiring jurors to assess credibility using 
much more reliable indicia, than demeanour. Furthermore, jury research suggests that a 
demeanour warning may be received at least as well as, if not better than, other current 
judicial directions.  Such a warning would have far less potential to be misconstrued, than 
some of the complex and counter-intuitive directions that are currently in use.   
The Court’s arguments, in respect of a demeanour warning’s potential to confuse jurors, are 
countered by the simple truth that all judicial warnings and directions are inherently 
imperfect and carry a risk of misinterpretation.  That risk could be further ameliorated by a 
well-worded warning such as the Canadian model, which was endorsed by the Court in E v R.   
Although it is true that a demeanour warning would always risk being misinterpreted by the 
jury, I submit that the greater risk to just determinations of proceedings is posed by jurors 
making demeanour-based credibility assessments.  As Sklansky surmised, while jury 
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directions might be imperfect, a much greater evil  would be to allow verdicts to be 
influenced by prohibited evidence or forbidden inferences.142   
In deciding to keep demeanour, as part of the overall witness credibility assessment, the 
Court of Appeal showed a desire to cling to the face value of witness testimony. This paper 
has suggested that the Court’s fascination with demeanour, as a means of assessing 
credibility, seems to be shared by other influential lawmakers.  In order to improve the 
accuracy of criminal jury proceedings it is hoped that both jurists and parliamentarians can 
look past the allure of demeanour and adopt a mandatory demeanour warning.  This approach 
would be   supported by contemporary science, and is preferable to continuing to allow 
credibility assessments to be made using a process which bears the same margin of error as a 
coin toss.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
142  Sklansky, above n 99,   456. 
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